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Kosovo’s FP, where Krasniqi remarks how 
“Kosovo’s path to full international sub-
jectivity is inherently linked to the issue 
of recognition and membership of inter-
national organisations. Therefore, in such 
cases, foreign policy gains a dual capaci-
ty, serving both as a tool of state-building 
and as a statehood prerogative” (217). The 
same could be said for almost all of the ex-
Yugoslav republics: Slovenia and Croatia 
were faced with similar challenges on the 
eve of their 1991 independence, followed 
closely by Bosnia and Macedonia – as de-
scribed by all the contributors in detail. 
These types of similarities provoke the 
narrative laid down in the very introduc-
tion to the book by its editors, Keil and 
Stahl, and especially by the welcome, but 
at the same time somewhat biased over-
view of the FP of Yugoslavia by Katrin 
Boeckh. While Keil and Stahl remain 
scholarly neutral in their introduction, it is 
Boeckh who somewhat fails to neutrally 
and objectively present the reality of Yu-
goslavia’s FP. Her overview may be factu-
ally (or maybe even historically) accurate, 
but at the same time she falls into the trap 
of Western-centric critique of the subject, 
with highlighting only Tito and “Titoism” 
as being most responsible for the unique 
success of Yugoslavia’s international rela-
tions. However, as all contributors noted, it 
was the very heritage of Yugoslav FP that 
was the foundation of the buildup of FP/IR 
actions of all post-Yugoslav states. And, as 
it is often notable through all entries, it was 
the domestic actors of Yugoslavia’s FP that 
founded the initial FPs in the contempo-
rary politics of today’s independent states. 
In the closing chapter of the book, Ame-
lia Hadfi eld provides the necessary theo-
retical background on the subject, chal-
lenging the methodology used by the 
book’s contributors, while giving a pro-
found overview of modern FP theory with 
a special emphasis on foreign policy ana-
lysis (FPA) and its role in contextualising 
both ex-Yugoslav states’ FP/IR and the EU 
in general. Maybe it would have been be-
nefi cial for the overall content of the book 
if the editors had decided to put such a 
chapter at the very beginning of the book, 
which can easily be circumvented by the 
reader by reading it straight after the initial 
introduction by Keil and Stahl. Neverthe-
less, this edited volume is to be highly re-
commended to all who have even a basic 
interest in the complex realities of the FPs 
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While pursuing the slightest interest in 
international politics, a phrase one might 
have heard attributed to Russia is “Third 
Rome”. Popping up occasionally in west-
ern media, more often when Russia engag-
es in controversial international activity, it 
often comes in the form of news articles 
pointing out some worrying strains over 
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Russia’s nationalist ideology, employing 
“Third Rome” as an orienting concept. 
The treatment and analysis of the idea are, 
however, mostly superfi cial. A more illu-
minating, serious and impartial attempt at 
analysis is Jardar Østbø’s book, detailing 
the vigorous life and importance of the 
idea (or more precisely, multiple ideas) 
in contemporary Russia’s nationalist dis-
course. Østbø is a post-doctoral fellow at 
Oslo University, in the Department of Li-
terature, Area Studies and European Lan-
guages, and this is his fi rst book, an up-
dated version of his PhD thesis. The book 
is accordingly written in a highly academic 
style.
The idea of a Third Rome is investigated 
here in the form of political myth – that is, 
“a narrative about a political society, usu-
ally as an incitement to action” (from Kol-
stø’s foreword). The phrase was fi rst men-
tioned by Filofei, a 16th-century Orthodox 
monk, and it was mostly used for a reli-
gious/eschatological purpose. It has since 
resurfaced many times in many different 
versions and for different purposes. Østbø 
focuses on its occurrence in post-Soviet 
Russia’s writings of nationalist ‘intellec-
tuals’, as an element in their narratives 
whose aim is to construct and reconstruct 
Russian national identity. For the purpose 
of the study, he chooses four prominent 
Russian nationalist writers, all four with 
a certain degree of support by the regime, 
namely: Vadim Tsymburskii, Aleksandr 
Dugin, Nataliia Narochnitskaia and Egor 
Kholmogorov. All four are representative 
and infl uential within four of the most im-
portant currents of contemporary Russian 
nationalism – Dugin of neo-Euroasianism, 
Kholmogorov of Orthodox nationalism, 
Tsymburskii of isolationism and Naroch-
nitskaia of neo-Slavophilia/pan-slavism. 
Østbø’s coverage of only four authors 
privileges depth over breadth. The work 
still manages to be representative, and 
choosing these authors not only allows for 
an in-depth analysis of the contemporary 
uses of the Third Rome myth and its func-
tions, but also for an insight into contem-
porary Russian nationalism.
The second chapter, after the introduc-
tion, starts with Østbø seeking to place 
his study within the relevant theoretical 
approaches on nationalism. Thus, juxta-
posing the ‘modernist’ school of authors 
such as Hobsbawm, Gellner and Ander-
son against the ethno-symbolist theory of 
Anthony D. Smith, Østbø seeks to defi ne 
and clarify concepts of nation, nationalism 
and the practice of ‘inventing’ a nation. 
In all of these instances he leans towards 
Smith’s theoretical framework. The ethno-
symbolist emphasis on “shared memories, 
symbols, myths, traditions and values” (p. 
13) as constituent elements of a nation and 
‘symbolic resources’ of nationalist ideolo-
gies serves as a basis for Østbø’s study, 
as he is interested in the ‘attainment and 
maintenance of identity’ through the use 
of myth in the (re)invention of the Russian 
nation by contemporary Russian nation-
alist intellectuals. Clarifying the notion 
of ‘invention’, Østbø agrees with Smith, 
against modernists, that it is impossible to 
“invent (fabricate) a nation from scratch”. 
However, he distances himself a bit from 
Smith’s idea that “intellectuals can choose 
only among specifi c myths that are already 
popular or at least have some ‘prior reso-
nance’” (p. 15), leaving more room for the 
reinvention and rewriting of existing and 
popular myths, making them more viable 
in present contexts. This is exactly what 
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happens with the Third Rome myth – Øst-
bø deals with its wide array of transforma-
tions in contemporary Russia.
The rest of the chapter deals with pecu-
liarities of Russian nationalism, namely, 
how the dichotomies of imperialism vs. 
nationalism and statist vs. cultural nation-
alism fall short in describing the nature of 
Russian nationalism, where these opposed 
characteristics come together almost dia-
lectically towards forms containing ele-
ments of both. The seemingly opposed 
conceptions complement each other. Such 
a state of affairs introduces a common 
motive of Russian uniqueness and excep-
tionalism, as can be seen amongst authors 
analysed later in the book. The chapter 
fi nishes with emphasising Orthodoxy as 
a most crucial element of contemporary 
Russian identity, not to mention any sort 
of nationalist ideology. 
The third chapter deals with the theory 
of political myth and how it applies to the 
idea of the Third Rome. Starting with a 
review of a number of important theories 
concerning political myth, Østbø points 
out key elements in each one – myth as 
an ideological narrative, as a story about 
a political society, as an incitement to ac-
tion, as constructing boundaries between 
social groups, as constructing identity, and 
as establishing a signifi cance and meaning 
of political experiences, each of which he 
considers in further analysis.1 The chapter 
then considers the Third Rome myth in its 
original form, a trifecta of epistles attribut-
ed to Starets Filofei. The original meaning 
1 In accordance with the definition of political 
myth which Pål Kolstø anticipates in the fore-
word, and as mentioned in the introduction to 
this review.
of the idea is sought through interpreta-
tions by medievalist scholars, which, Øst-
bø concedes, is likely accurate in interpret-
ing Filofei’s intentions as religious, rather 
than political in any way. Østbø concludes 
that, as such, the original idea cannot itself 
be considered a myth, only its later inter-
pretations. Examples thereof, standing op-
posite to medievalist scholarship, are at-
tempts at uncovering the meaning of Third 
Rome in ‘generalist’ history works. They 
posit that Third Rome signifi es an ‘es-
sence’ of Russia, which determines its na-
ture, its behaviour and ultimately its fate, 
whether this were a geographical entity, a 
population, a transcendental principle, or 
some combination of these. Such essen-
tialist accounts, which already somewhat 
function as myths, either paint Russia in 
a positive light, e.g., philosopher Nikolai 
Fedorov and his universalist Russian mes-
sianism, or in a negative one,2 e.g., British 
historian Arnold Toynbee’s conception of 
Russia as a ‘distinct and different civilisa-
tion’, ultimately hostile to the West, not 
only in the Cold War context, but through 
history in general.
What Østbø seeks is to distance himself 
from this ‘purist’ paradigm. Both genera-
list and medievalist approaches seek to 
fi nd the ‘true’ meaning of the Third Rome. 
While medievalist scholarship is useful in 
uncovering the roots of the idea, it does 
not do much for understanding later in-
terpretations, and labelling those as ‘mis-
understandings’ or ‘misuses’ gets us no-
where. The medieval manuscripts serve to 
2 Negative accounts of Third Rome show that 
political myth is not only aimed inwards for the 
purpose of forming identity, but also outwards, 
forming identity in opposition to the other.
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“... provide the basic narrative which is be-
ing constantly reappropriated in order to 
generate signifi cance” (p. 55). Østbø con-
cludes: “For the student of political myth, 
there is in principle no correct or incorrect 
use of a myth, since myths are not static, 
but dynamic... the political myth of the 
Third Rome does not have any meaning 
outside its use and no use without a con-
text” (p. 54-55). He proposes a model of 
three interrelated, rather than strictly de-
lineated, modes of expression of the myth 
– the original, the interpretations and the 
meta-interpretations, in constant interac-
tion. 
Chapters four through seven compose 
the main body of the work. They consist 
of “Close readings, reconstruction and in-
terpretation of the individual authors’ ver-
sions of the myth of the Third Rome” (p. 
10). The examined authors’ entire body 
of work is considered, whether it be in 
academic publishing (where applicable) 
or internet blog posts. The fi rst is Vadim 
Tymburskii (1957-2009), a university 
professor and an infl uential theorist of 
Russian geopolitical thought. He can be 
readily distinguished from the other three 
authors as being the only one who does 
not argue for Russian expansion or at least 
greater Russian infl uence in the post-So-
viet space. He suggests for Russia to con-
centrate its attention within its present bor-
ders, and presents the post-Soviet “huge 
territorial loss as a return to the ‘normal’ 
and ‘desired’ state of affairs” (p. 95). His 
work is an attempt to reconsider Rus-
sian history and make sense of Russia’s 
new status after the end of the Cold War. 
Using a Spenglerian civilisation approach, 
he argues that ‘Russia became Russia’ in 
the 15th and 16th centuries, under the infl u-
ence of the geographically-determined ‘is-
land mentality’ and infl uence of Byzantine 
culture. The Third Rome fi gures as a sort of 
mental image of the ‘true Russia’ conven-
tion. Tsymburskii’s conclusion is the need 
for an isolationist stance and a Russian 
‘counter-reformation’, bringing it closer to 
its true nature constituted in pre-imperial 
Rus’.
The second author is Aleksandr Dugin, 
who recently, once again, appeared in 
Western media as a Russian boogeyman. 
In an article published last December, the 
web portal BigThink called him “the most 
dangerous philosopher in the world” and 
“Putin’s Rasputin” (Ratner, 2016). Dugin 
is likely the most eccentric and esoteric of 
the four. His thought is fi rmly anti-ration-
alist and traditionalist with strong elements 
of mysticism. Drawing from a seemingly 
incompatible array of schools of thought, 
such as classical geopolitics and Jungian 
psychoanalysis, Dugin constructs a grand 
narrative of a historic Manichaean strug-
gle between good and evil, with Russia 
representing salvation and the West cor-
ruption. As such, he gives Russia the mes-
sianic, divinely warranted mission to “lead 
other Eurasian peoples and free them from 
Western (‘Atlantist’) hegemony” (p. 81). 
The Third Rome represents this princi-
ple, while the West fi gures as an impostor 
‘Fourth Rome’. 
The third author is Nataliia Narochnit-
skaia, a historian associated with the con-
servative Orthodox sector of Russian na-
tionalism. Her uniqueness amongst other 
authors lays in offering a meta-interpre-
tation of the myth. Her approach towards 
the history of ideas posits religion as its 
essential foundation – for instance, every 
ideology or political doctrine, even the 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2016, pp. 236-241
240
most secular, can be explained by tracing 
its religious roots. Her main aim is to in-
terpret Russian history in relation to the 
West. Østbø (noting the risk of oversim-
plifi cation) summarises her thesis as fol-
lows: the countries of the West throughout 
history remain heretical or godless. They 
are hostile towards Russia and desire to 
destroy it. Russia fi gures as a protector of 
the true faith, and its historic behaviour is 
more justifi able morally than that of the 
West. Dominant images of Russia in the 
West are false stereotypes rooted in hereti-
cal and inhumane thought. The myth of the 
Third Rome as replicated in the West that 
paints Russia as imperialist and anti-demo-
cratic (for instance, Toynbee) is an exam-
ple of one such stereotype.
The fi nal author is Egor Kholmogorov, a 
freelance journalist and ideological merce-
nary, who seeks to win favour of both the 
regime and the country’s more radical ele-
ments. He is by far the most diffi cult to fol-
low, as he has an ability to write at length 
about a wide array of ideas, unexpectedly 
jumping from one to the other, while stay-
ing as shallow as a puddle, not to mention 
often contradicting himself. Presenting his 
bizarre set of ideas, which mostly revolve 
around Russian exceptionalism and wide-
spread political mobilisation based on an 
Orthodox identity, would be diffi cult in 
such little space. Instead, I will quote Øst-
bø’s verdict: “Kholmogorov is no schol-
ar, but a quintessential myth-maker. He 
sees historical events, facts and processes 
as a reservoir to be exploited to achieve 
his political goal: Russia is to be world 
leader, both politically and in religion” (p. 
141).
The eighth chapter is a conclusion and 
a short review of the functions the Third 
Rome myth serves in the authors’ attempts 
at ‘reinventing’ the Russian nation in the 
post-Soviet era. They are defi nitions of 
who is Russian (and who is not), defi ning 
the boundaries of Russia ‘as they should 
be’, a foundation myth, a factor of historic 
continuity, moral prerogative, importance 
of Orthodoxy and Russian ‘uniqueness’. 
The fi nal chapter, dubbed an epilogue, is a 
short account of three of the authors’ (ex-
cluding Tsymburskii, who passed away) 
reactions to the events in Ukraine between 
2013 and 2015, as well as their most re-
cent uses of the Third Rome myth. Østbø 
notes that in the context of these recent 
events, the Third Rome myth has entered 
the mainstream – in 2014 a conference de-
voted entirely to the concept of the Third 
Rome was organised in Moscow by no less 
than the Moscow Patriarchy and the Min-
istry of Culture. Dugin and Narochnitskaia 
attended and gave speeches.
Østbø manoeuvres several different are-
as of theory to prime his study, successfully 
mobilising each one. Especially in the area 
of political myth, which Østbø concedes 
is “relatively limited and far less known” 
(p. 28), he manages to wrangle with diver-
gent sources to create a basis that fi ts well 
his object of study. The theoretical frames 
are well connected with other scholar-
ship on various subjects such as Russian 
nationalism, medieval scholarship and re-
ligious interpretation. The history of the 
Third Rome myth prior to the contempo-
rary era is well covered. The study of these 
four authors must have been quite a feat, 
give that the whole breadth of their work 
was considered. Østbø manages to compe-
tently handle the wide array of eccentric 
ideas the authors employ. It also needs to 
be mentioned that, as Pål Kolstø mentions 
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in the foreword, Østbø does not fall into 
the trap of presenting ideas and systems as 
more coherent than warranted, and is not 
afraid to point out contradictions and in-
congruities. The book will surely please 
readers coming from a wide array of dif-
ferent interests, whether it is nationalism, 
Russian politics, religion, the history of 
ideas or many others.
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